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1LEARNING TO LOOK: LESSONS FROM IRIS MURDOCH1 
Nancy E. Snow
Marquette University
INTRODUCTION
I am very grateful to Peggy Vandenberg and Deborah Mower for
inviting me to give this symposium. I’ve long been interested in the work
of Iris Murdoch, and this conference gives me the chance to explore
applications of her work to moral development in the classroom. My
presentation falls into four sections. First, I’ll discuss central aspects of
Murdoch’s philosophy. Second, I’ll introduce the notion of unselfing
(from Murdoch) and the related idea of askesis  a Greek noun for
‘practice,’ ‘exercise,’ or ‘training,’ (from Pierre Hadot), as possible aims of
classroom teaching and learning. Third, I’ll consider specific uses of
literature and film as adventures in attempted askesis and unselfing.
Finally, I’ll close with very brief reflections on a familiar Murdochian
theme   morality and art   as a countercultural response to current trends
in higher education. 
MURDOCHIAN COMPLEXITIES2
Iris Murdoch is one of the few philosophers also to have been a
novelist and to have had her life memorialized in a popular film
(Iris, 2002). Yet her work has been relatively neglected by mainstream
philosophers. There are several reasons for this. For one thing, Murdoch
was a maverick, forcefully challenging the received philosophical wisdom
of her day in trenchant critiques of behaviorism, existentialism,
emotivism, prescriptivism, and ordinary language philosophy, and
bringing an array of often novel influences, for example, the writings
of Simone Weil, to bear on the development of her philosophical
perspectives. For another thing, Murdoch’s thought is just plain hard. It is
dense and difficult, and resists pigeon-holing into the typical categories
of moral philosophy. Whatever the explanation, there seems to be a
recent resurgence of interest in her work. This is all to the good, for
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Murdoch has much to offer. Indeed, many of her ideas seem perfectly
suited to the theme of this conference: “The Art of Morality: Developing
Moral Sensitivity Across the Curriculum.”
This is so for a number of reasons. For one thing, Murdoch
departed from her contemporaries in the way she thought of ethics. In
her day, and even later, some philosophers have thought ethics should be
modeled on science. She, by contrast, thought ethics should be modeled
on art. Second, unlike many of her contemporaries, she did not endorse
the fact/value distinction, the idea that facts and values are separate and
separable metaphysical kinds. She thought facts and values were
inextricably intertwined; the world itself and even our consciousness of
it, is permeated with values and cannot be intelligibly described in
value-neutral terms. This is a difficult thought to grasp, and there is
controversy about it in Murdoch scholarship, as well as more generally in
philosophy. Finally, the philosopher Plato heavily influenced her thinking.
His was by no means the only influence on her thought, but it was
significant  so significant that we cannot understand Murdoch without
adverting to his thinking. 
Let us investigate each of these strands of Murdoch’s thought in
more detail, starting with what I take to be the deepest influence, that of
Plato. In his allegory of the cave, sketched in the Republic, Plato uses the
metaphor of ascending from the darkness of a cave, where we dimly see
images and shadows, into the dazzling light of the sun, which illuminates
and allows us to see clearly and fully. The metaphor charts a cognitive
progression: images are flawed and untrustworthy representations of
objects in the world, and objects in the world, flawed and untrustworthy
representations of the Forms, or Ideas. Forms or Ideas are the true and
abiding reality, and our journey from images to Forms is illuminated by
the Form of the Good, represented by the sun. 
The allegory is rich in meaning. Not only is the progression a
cognitive one, it is also moral. The Form of the Good, infusing both
objects and cognitions with light, permeates being with value. The
progression of consciousness from images to the Forms, made possible
by the Form of the Good, is a moral progression wherein the agent
comes to a fuller, more nuanced understanding of being, truth, and
goodness. The Form of the Good is also beautiful, so we can add beauty
to the list of those values made accessible to us by our progression into
goodness. Why would or should we make this ascent? According to
Plato, goodness attracts; the Form of the Good has a kind of magnetic
appeal, pulling us up out of darkness and forward to it. Central to this
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account is its teleological structure. The Form of the Good is the end or
telos that attracts us and toward which we strive. The world and our
experience of it are shaped in the light of its influence. 
This barest sketch of the allegory of the cave will help us to get
some of Murdoch’s key ideas into focus. Murdoch, like Plato, thought
that value is transcendent, though she did not believe in a god. She did
not believe that value is created through human choice, but is to be
discovered. Value or goodness is part of the fabric of reality that extends
beyond the human realm. We discover goodness through moral
development, though, as we’ll see, we also “build up” value. In
Murdoch’s view, we come to appreciate value and to have it in our lives
through the progressive refinement of consciousness. That is, we
encounter moral goodness, and cultivate it in ourselves, through the
quality of our consciousness, especially through our attention to the
world around us. Thus, cognition and attention, and not choice, are the
primary modes in which we encounter and build value in our lives. This
and other themes in Murdochian thought (for example, art as the model
for morality) leads the Murdoch scholar Maria Antonaccio to claim that
Murdoch develops an ethics of vision, as opposed to an ethics of choice
(Antonaccio 2012a, p. 161). Key to this ethics of vision is the human
capacity to “picture ourselves,” and then come to resemble the picture
(Antonaccio 2012a, p. 160). Through successive picturing, we draw ever
closer to the transcendent good. Murdoch’s ethics, Antonaccio (2012a, p.
166) writes, is the study of moral transformation. 
The quality of consciousness is key to this outlook. What is the
nature of cognition and attention through which we picture ourselves
and by means of which moral transformation takes place? Of what are
we conscious? For Murdoch, we are not conscious of neutral facts onto
which we project values or which elicit subjective responses in us. She
rejects Hume’s fact/value distinction, just as she rejects his moral
psychology, according to which beliefs and desires are separate and
separable types of mental state. For her, the world is value-laden, colored
by the effects of transcendent goodness, and consciousness  cognition
and attention  are value-laden as well. Belief and desire are not readily
separable, but, in the virtuous person at least, form a unitary whole. This
is a complex and puzzling picture, for it makes sense to say that facts and
values, as well as belief and desires, are distinct. It seems perfectly
reasonable for me to say, for example, “That sweater is red,” and to make
the separate evaluative claim, “That sweater is odious.” Odiousness does
not seem “built into” the sweater’s being red, but instead, seems to be a
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subjective value that I project onto it, or as Hume would say, is a
sentiment aroused in me at the sight of the sweater. Similarly, I can have
numerous beliefs without accompanying desires. I can believe that
someone is in need without thereby desiring to help that person, or
feeling moved by her plight.
Murdoch rejects the Humean picture and takes a different view.
Recall the allegory of the cave. It is only through seeing light, that is,
encountering value, that we are able truly to see that which is around us.
Light illuminates what is there, so that it looks different; we get a better
perspective on what is really there (Antonaccio 2012b, p. 85). Think of
the mundane example of walking into a dark room, where we see only
dark shapes and shadows. When we switch on the light, we can see what
is actually there   a chair, a sofa, etc. Similarly, moral value transforms our
vision, allowing us to see more clearly the reality of others. Let us explore
this theme through Murdoch’s famous example of M and D: 
A mother, whom I shall call M, feels hostility to her
daughter-in-law,whom I shall call D. M finds D quite a good-
hearted girl, but while not exactly common yet certainly
unpolished and lacking in dignity and refinement. D is inclined
to be pert and familiar, insufficiently ceremonious, brusque,
sometimes positively rude, always tiresomely juvenile. M does
not like D’s accent or the way D dresses. M feels that her son
has married beneath him. Let us assume for the purposes of
the example that the mother, who is a very ‘correct’ person,
behaves beautifully to the girl throughout, not allowing her real
opinion to appear in any way. We might underline this aspect of
the example by supposing that the young couple have
emigrated or that D is now dead: the point being to ensure that
whatever is in question as happening happens entirely in M’s
mind.
Thus much for M’s first thoughts about D. Time passes,
and it could be that M settles down with a hardened sense of
grievance and a fixed picture of D, imprisoned (if I may use a
question begging word) by the cliché: my poor son has married
a silly vulgar girl. However, the M of the example is an
intelligent well-intentioned person, capable of self-criticism,
capable of giving careful and just attention to an object, which
confronts her. M tells herself: “I am old-fashioned and
conventional. I may be prejudiced and narrow-minded. I may
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be snobbish. I am certainly jealous. Let me look again”
(Murdoch 1970, pp. 17-18; italics hers).
Several features of the example are important. For one thing, it is
often noted that the transformation in looking is happening entirely in
M’s mind. Her behavior toward D has always been impeccable, never
betraying her hostility. As time passes, M begins to reflect. As a result of
these thoughts, she pictures D differently, describing her in a different
and more complimentary vocabulary. This transformation in the
concepts used to describe D reveals that M has allowed her vision of D
to be influenced by goodness. What blocks our ability to see the
goodness of others, according to Murdoch, are the twin evils of neurosis
and convention. M’s odyssey is described in terms suggestive primarily of
the overcoming of neurosis (though we shouldn’t rule out the effects of
convention): she identifies flaws in herself that prevented her from
having a just view of D. In Murdoch’s terms, the overcoming of these
flaws enabled M to attain a “loving gaze” toward D. In metaphysical
terms, the loving gaze is a form of vision that is informed by the
transcendent value of goodness. Our ascent to goodness allows us to
slough off the factors, such as neurosis and the effects of convention,
that occlude our moral vision, enabling us to form ever clearer pictures
of ourselves and others. The loving picture of D that M achieves reflects
a moral progression in M herself. Her change in vision reflects changes in
attitudes. Antonaccio (2012b, chapters 5 and 6) calls this process
“unselfing,” and argues that it has both renunciatory and constructive
aspects. 
As an entrée into a description of unselfing, let’s recall the earlier
claim that for Murdoch, ethics is not like science, but like art. We’re now
better positioned to see how this is so. M is not involved in fact-finding;
she is not investigating facts about D in the hope that she will discover
some hitherto unknown bit of information that will change her
perspective. Instead, M is engaged in something akin to self-creation or
self-sculpting. Her changes are in herself   in her own attitudes toward D.
In the process of sloughing off the negative attitudes toward D that
caused her occluded vision, she is also building up more positive ones
that enable her to see D with a loving gaze. How is this like art? Consider
the process of sculpting. A good sculptor selects her object, then starts
chipping away those bits that prevent the design from showing through.
In many respects, the artist is guided by a vision of what the result will
look like, but this vision is subject to revision as the artistic process
gathers its own impetus. At some point, the sculpture which “needs to be
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made” will guide the artistic process. The process itself is a progressive
alternation between sloughing off and building up   taking away those
bits of material that occlude the design and adding bits to the form that is
taking shape. A more mundane example is that of writing a philosophy
paper. We might start out with an idea for a paper in mind, even a
structure, but good papers seem to have lives of their own in the sense
that the ideas themselves often appear to dictate how they should go
together. In Plato’s terms, we follow the logos   the meaning or thread of
the argument as it unfolds. I view the process of unselfing to be like this.
As our vision improves, we are able to see and work to overcome or
discard those bits of ourselves that hold us back, while building up new
aspects of our selves that support and facilitate progressive refinements
of our consciousness. We can never fully see what our final selves will
look like, but we seem pulled inexorably forward by picturing who we
might become. 
In the next section, I will continue describing the process of
unselfing by considering how the use of film and literature in the
classroom can motivate progressive refinements of vision and attention
and the creation of concomitant pictures of the self. 
UNSELFING AND ASKESIS
Murdoch was, of course, a novelist. As an author, she used her
novels to capture nuances of moral meaning that were not amenable to
expression in academic writing. As readers of novels and other genres,
and as viewers of films, we can use these media in other ways, specifically,
as aids in the process of ethical transformation, both of ourselves and of
our students. How might this process work?  
One of the puzzling features of the story of M and D is the question
of why M should undertake her odyssey of self-transformation. Why has
M become motivated to think about her feelings toward D after all these
years? Murdoch leaves open the possibility that M does not become so
motivated, but settles into a hardened sense of grievance. Surely many
people go down that path, refusing to take on the hard reflection that
might lead to change. What might prompt one otherwise? In the example
of M, Murdoch almost casually suggests that D might have died. This
suggestion is made in the context of stressing that M’s transformation is
entirely inner. D’s death, could, of course, have been a factor catalyzing
M to reconsider her relationship with D. Additionally, M has some
things going for her: the M of the example is “. . . an intelligent well-
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intentioned person, capable of self-criticism, capable of giving carefuland
just attention to an object, which confronts her” (Murdoch 1970, p. 17). 
The casual reference to D’s possible death offers a clue as to what
might cause a person to undertake serious self-reflection: the occurrence
of trauma. A painful divorce, the death of a loved one, a family tragedy, a
career gone awry  these are the kinds of events that push people into
therapy and can induce them to begin to reflect on who they are as
persons. As teachers, we have an advantage: our students are a captive
audience. They need not experience a painful event to prompt them to
self-reflection. We can aid them to engage in the process of refining their
attention in ways Murdoch advocates through the use of film and
literature. 
Let me be clear that I am not suggesting that we foist sets of values
upon our students or that we force them to agree with our vision of what
is going on in literature and films. Anyone who has taught college
students knows that attempts to force a view are met with resistance and
are ultimately self-defeating. Yet a crude understanding of Murdoch’s
realism might lend itself to something like the forcing of a specific moral
vision. After all, Murdoch thought the truth was there to be discovered,
not created through human choice. Why would she not approve of
“forcing” or “foisting” a moral vision upon someone? Antonaccio
(2012b, p. 30, p. 43) responds by arguing that Murdoch endorses a
‘reflexive realism,’ according to which each person must make her own
pilgrimage from appearance to reality. Like the ascent from the cave, the
pilgrimage is very personal, and takes place through the medium of
individual consciousness. Thus, we cannot force another to “see” with
genuine moral vision. The best we can do is to try to guide her
consciousness to a place where she can see for herself. She alone can
make the journey of moral transformation.
The language I’m using, that of ‘pilgrimage’ and ‘journey,’ is
common in religious idioms. Indeed, Murdoch tried to recover religious
sensibilities and the notion of a transcendent good without God (see
Antonaccio, 2012b, chapter 7). Though this aspect of her work is
fascinating, more directly relevant to the use of literature and film in the
classroom is Antonaccio’s (2012b, chapter 5) claim that Murdoch can be
read as advocating habits of refining moral attention along lines similar to
philosophers such as Pierre Hadot (1995). Hadot (1995) urges that
philosophy is a form of spiritual exercise. According to Antonaccio
(2012b, p. 127), Hadot (1995) uses the Greek noun askesis to mean
‘exercise,’ ‘practice,’ or ‘training,’ and distinguishes it from later Christian
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uses of the term ‘ascetism’ that mean self-denial. Hadot’s (1995) insight,
inspired by his reading of Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations, is that philosophy
is a discipline for life. 
I want to appropriate Antonaccio’s (2012b) notion of spiritual
exercises and Hadot’s (1995) idea of askesis to suggest that classroom
teaching and learning should include sustained and serious practice in the
development and refinement of students’ capacities for attention. That is,
they should learn how to look, how to see, how to attend to things in an
open and reflective manner. In short, they should be exposed to practices
that aim to inculcate good habits of mind. As a purely cognitive discipline
by means of which students develop habits of careful attention and
reading, askesis can be practiced in any classroom with any subject. As a
discipline intended to refine moral attention and sensitivities, it can be
practiced in numerous fields, and using literature and film can help. As I
see it, unselfing can take place via askesis   the discipline of the practice of
looking, seeing, and developing one’s attention can lead to changes in the
self. 
But the notion of unselfing, with its dual movements of
renunciation and build-up, goes beyond the mere refinement of
attention, even when moral attention and sensitivities are in play, to effect
changes in the self. One might accede that the honing of moral attention
and sensitivities is a legitimate goal of classroom practice, but question
whether it’s the place of the college professor to aim for the “unselfing”
of her students. Should we aim to change people’s lives? Isn’t this goal an
expression of hubris? Three argument sketches suggest that “unselfing”
is not an inappropriate goal of educators.
The first and most general is that the college years are ones of
growth and transformation. They are a passage from the teen-aged years
of high schoolers still under parental care to the time when young people
are presumed able to enter society as functioning, autonomous adults. In
other words, the college years are a phase in the life cycle during which
unselfing should take place, as students mature into young adulthood.
College is thus an important time during which students should be
encouraged to think for themselves. Part of this thinking can and should
unsettle the notions of identity they held in high school, which were not
fully formed.  It is far better that students should undertake the processes
of learning, moral growth, and identity formation with competent and
caring guidance than without. Consequently, there is a legitimate role for
college professors in the process of aiding their students to “unself.” An
important caveat to this argument sketch is that unselfing should not
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consist only of renunciation, or the tearing down of undesired aspects of
personality. Students, especially during the vulnerable college years,
should be encouraged to identify and seek to develop their strengths.
Again, literature and film can help to highlight both positive and negative
personalities and behavior that students can use as models. 
A second argument for a legitimate place for unselfing in the college
years is suggested by the mission statements of many colleges and
universities. Many of these statements profess that institutions are
dedicated to excellence in education. Why should excellence not include
excellence in being a person, including excellence in moral attention and
sensitivity? People can be better or worse; why not strive (students and
teachers) to be better? Recognition of this, I take it, would prompt
professors to understand that they do not teach only chemistry or
philosophy or accounting, but people. We teach people  who have lives
that extend beyond the classroom. So I would say that taking seriously an
ethics of unselfing is to acknowledge, first and foremost, an obligation to
treat students as people in our care, to help them to strive for excellence
in the ways of which they are capable, and to help them in their
developmental journeys as people who can be better or worse, happy or
unfulfilled, morally aware and engaged or morally oblivious. We have the
ability to effect change for the good.
Finally, many religious institutions, such as my own  a Jesuit
university   profess to offer transformative education and to create life-
long learners. Education in these terms is not always an indoctrination
into certain values. In the Jesuit tradition, at least, transformative
education reflects the view that learning changes the person. Part of this
change is, and should be, moral growth. As I and many colleagues
understand this, the aim is not to foist a set of values onto students, but
to empower them to make their own thoughtful, autonomous, and
informed choices about the values they adopt. Part of this empowerment
is to provide them with multiple perspectives   to expose them to the
richness and variety of views, moral and otherwise, to be discovered
through education, and to guide them in the sense of helping them find
their own way through this exciting terrain. If our enthusiasm for
learning is infectious, we might plant the seed of life-long learning in
them. One important way of doing this, I believe, is through the use
askesis   the inculcation of habits of attention in students, leading, ideally,
to their unselfing   to the process of reflection by means of which they
identify and overcome negative traits, habits, and actions, and build more
positive ones in their place. With any luck, students will begin to see
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many occasions for learning   through literature, film, art, and so on   as
means of educating and transforming themselves.
The foregoing argument sketches show that there is a legitimate
place for askesis and unselfing in higher education. The kind of teacher-
student interaction I am suggesting is avowedly counter cultural in the
sense that it cuts against the grain of current trends in higher education.
Today we see higher education under attack. Budget cuts threaten
colleges and universities across the nation; armies of adjuncts replace
tenured and tenure-track faculty; on-line education is becoming more
prevalent; and for-profit institutions are increasingly familiar. Higher
education, in my view, is tending to become a constellation of
information delivery systems, in which education is viewed as the fast
and efficient delivery of information facts, figures, formulas, and
algorithms  to students for use in the professions. It is a truism that
colleges and universities have become “corporatized” according to
business models. Higher education, I fear, is going the way of health care
provision. 
Proposing a robust model of teacher-student interaction premised
on the value of askesis and unselfing counters these trends, calling to
mind the deeper value of education as personal formation. Let us turn to
some adventures with literature and film in the classroom that might
have had an impact on the personal formation of students. 
LITERATURE, FILM, AND MORAL SENSITIVITIES
Let me confess at the outset that I have not used literature or film
extensively in the classroom, and I have never deliberately used it as part
of the process of unselfing. I have, however, used both media in attempts
to develop students’ habits of attention, and to explore nuances of good
and evil often missed in philosophical texts. I’ll mention three
“adventures” with literature and film in the classroom, two of which I
regard as moderately successful and one which was a flop. 
The flop was the use of Herman Melville’s novella Billy Budd in a
philosophy of law class, and I attribute its failure to my rigidity with
respect to the students’ encounter with the text. I specifically wanted
them to identify natural law and positivist positions in a speech in the
work, and directed them to read the text too narrowly. Billy Budd, as I’m
sure you’ll remember, is an incredibly rich psychological portrait of good
and evil, redolent with male homoerotic desire. Questions of the use and
misuse of the rule of law abound. But my problem was attempting to
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force them to focus their attention on a specific issue, thereby alerting
them in advance to the fact that there was something I wanted them to
find. Their engagement with the text was reduced to searching for the
“right answer,” or to “guess what’s in the teacher’s mind.” The processes
of askesis and unselfing provide corrective guidance. If I were to use Billy
Budd again today, I would follow cues given by Murdoch, and allow
students to engage with the work freely, guiding them from time to time
in their responses and interpretations. In this way, I wouldn’t force a
mode of attention upon them, but would let the text speak to them
directly. They would then be able to engage with the messages in the text
through the medium of their own consciousness, letting it speak to them
and guide their attention in ways suitable to their individual experiences.
The moral of the story, for me, is that reading is as much an individual
experience as anything else, and too didactic an approach can spoil
students’ reading experiences. Their own consciousness, shaped by their
own life experiences, is the natural starting point for any journey of
development we seek to help them with. 
My second story is of a more successful use of film in the
classroom. The class was medical ethics, and the film was a documentary
by Bill Moyers about physician-assisted suicide. The film took us through
three case studies. One was a woman with terminal cancer in Oregon
who had made arrangements for physician-assisted suicide; a second, a
man with Lou Gehrig’s disease, living in Virginia, who did not have that
option; and a third, a man dying of liver failure in a hospital in Kentucky,
again, without the option of physician-assisted suicide. Moyers did
sensitive interviews with patients (where possible), families, and
physicians. In this course, I did have a specific goal related to unselfing.
The class was populated by pre-professional students, including a
number of pre-meds who seemed focused only on getting into medical
school and nothing else. Sensitivity to patients and the quality of care
seemed miles away from their world views. In addition, many were
conservative Catholics, rejecting out of hand the possibility of physician-
assisted suicide as contradictory to their religious beliefs. In many cases, it
seemed to me, these beliefs had not been subjected to critical scrutiny,
nor the plight of terminally ill patients and their families truly
appreciated. 
The film was a powerful one. Two of the three case studies were
especially riveting. The Oregon woman who had chosen physician-
assisted suicide did not die as she had planned. She had two daughters,
both of whom wanted to be with her when she died. One lived some
12 Teaching Ethics, Spring 2013
distance away, and the two daughters decided to wait for her to come,
thereby missing the legal window of opportunity within which suicide
could have been done. Moyers’ interview with the daughters after their
mother’s death was especially moving, as both cried and expressed guilt
and regret that they had not acceded to their mother’s wishes. The
daughter whose trip caused the delay was especially moving. Both women
were young   just a few years older than my students. 
The second case, of the man with Lou Gehrig’s disease, was
gripping too, as Moyers charted his inevitable decline. Wheelchair-bound
when first encountered in the film, Moyers documented how his wife and
other caretakers had to see to his every need, feeding him, clothing him,
shaving him, and so on. The man, a farmer, and his family expressed
strong religious beliefs against physician-assisted suicide, and the patient
himself often stated his desire to live until he died a natural death. Yet the
film showed the progressive strain on the family, especially the wife, as
the efforts to provide care intensified and costs increased. Eventually,
they stood to lose their farm. 
My aim was to watch the film with the students and then have
discussion. Discussion was impossible, however. At the film’s end, the
students sat silently with sorrowful faces. Some were in tears. My
attempts at discussion during the next class period met with tepid
responses. Was this venture compromised by the lack of discussion?
Perhaps. Ideally, we would have analyzed the film together. However, I
hope that my goal of unselfing was at least partially met, for that goal
consisted in large part of urging my pre-professional students to feel with
patients, to enter emotionally into their situations and their plights. I
wanted to find a way for them to empathize with the fear and suffering of
patients and their families. I thought this was an important moral aspect
of their professional development. Training in medical school, I feared,
was likely to block the empathic mechanisms that would allow them to
feel with patients  perhaps necessarily so  but the blockage would
constitute a loss to their humanity. At some point in their careers,
they needed to be brought face to face with the fact that patients are
people  flesh and blood, living people, with situations and ideas that
differ from those of their health care providers. I hoped that nurturing
the humanity of the potential providers would be one way of countering
the increasing inhumanity of health care systems.
In my third use of literature and film, I went all out and used
nothing but these two media in the classroom. This was in an Honors
Program course I taught entitled, “A Philosophical Look at Vampires:
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Portrayals of Good and Evil in Vampire Fiction and Film.” As most
popular culture buffs know, interest in vampires is on the rise. In fact, a
new generation of vampires has burst upon the contemporary scene,
namely, beautiful, good, morally decent vampires with whom we can
relate and empathize. We might even want to be like them. Such positive
portrayals are recent developments.
My course was a partial historical survey of vampire fiction and film
in the west. It started with some predecessors of the title character of
Bram Stoker’s novel Dracula, and explored contemporary vampire fiction
in novels by Anne Rice, Stephen King, and a series of short stories found
in The Penguin Book of Vampire Stories. Many philosophical themes (for
example, the nature of death and immortality) are explored in vampire
fiction, and our class touched on all of them. My primary interest, as the
course title suggests, was in portrayals of good and evil. I was not
interested in unselfing, per se, but did want to expand students’
sensitivities about how we perceive good and evil and how it is portrayed
in works of film and fiction in a specific, and very popular, genre. I
wanted to prompt reflection on good and evil as presented in that genre
not only because it is interesting and fun, but also because it is frequently
consumed, especially by young people, without a second thought. Here I
want to discuss three classic vampire films: the 1922 silent classic,
Nosferatu, directed by F. W. Murnau and starring Max Schreck as the
vampire; Tod Browning’s 1931 Dracula, starring Bela Lugosi; and Francis
Ford Coppola’s film, Bram Stoker’s Dracula, starring Gary Oldman and
Winona Ryder. 
Though my primary aim was to explore the development of
depictions of good and evil, it became clear that my students did not
know how to look at films. I now want to discuss still photos from these
films to highlight important themes and aspects I wanted the students to
notice and appreciate. Consider, for example, the first photo, of
Nosferatu at the bedside of his victim. 
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The first thing to notice is his sheer “otherness.” He is not like
us   his face, eyes, ears, teeth and hands are the hands of a creature that is
not human. The message here is that evil is not like us   it is wholly and
purely other. The second important aspect of the photo is the play of
light and darkness. Dramatic contrasts of light and dark are evident
throughout Murnau’s silent film, in which visual depictions convey
images laden with meaning for the astute viewer. Finally, a subtle message
is communicated through the rosary hanging on the wall behind
Nosferatu  he often appears juxtaposed with religious symbols of
goodness. 
The second photo, of Nosferatu in an archway, reinforces these
themes. We see his creepy vampire-like otherness, light and dark are used
in dramatic visual contrasts, and the archway itself is reminiscent of
churches and religious architecture. 
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A third photo, of Nosferatu on the deck of the ship that conveyed
him from his home in Transylvania to Bremen, the city of his victim, is
an amazing glimpse of the vampire by day. The vampire’s claw-like hands
are replicated in the ropes that coil around the mast to his left (the right
in the viewer’s perspective on the photo), as he stands framed by the
ship’s sparse rigging. The rigging itself, with its crossed ropes, calls to
mind the religious figure of the cross   a image that is widely replicated in
the background of the vampire in images throughout the film.
Finally, we see the shadow of the vampire at night, creeping up the
stairs to the bedroom of his victim. The vampire’s otherness, light and
shadow, and the angular lines of the banisters on the staircase all
reinforce common visual themes at play in the film’s cinematography.
In Nosferatu (1922), we have a portrait of the vampire as purely evil,
and purely other. In 1931, with the appearance of Bela Lugosi in Tod
Browning’s Dracula, we have a more complex interpretation of the figure
and character of the vampire. 
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In this first picture of Bela Lugosi as Count Dracula, we see, again,
the interplay of light and darkness. Unlike Nosferatu, however, the
vampire is more like us    more human. His intense gaze, highlighted by a
slant of light falling across the middle of his face, exerts a hypnotic
fascination. Here the count is attired in his traditional cape and
high-collared shirt. In the next photo, we see that Dracula is so much like
us that he “passes” in civilized society.
Here is Dracula in the drawing room, having given his card to the
butler and been announced as a new neighbor on a visit. He is dashing,
debonair, urbane, sophisticated, and correct, polished in his manners. He
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is invited and welcomed into our homes, our drawing rooms, trusted as
we introduce him to our wives and daughters. He is one of us. Evil is no
longer other, but is recognized as being like us   so much like us that we
cannot now discern good from evil until it is (almost) too late. Evil, in
human form, is now among us.
Evil is so much like us, or perhaps, in us, that it is only through the
special services of an expert that we can unmask and expunge it.
Here the vampire is being “outed” by the vampire hunter,
Professor Van Helsing. Van Helsing is a scientist   a man of specialized
knowledge  who has been brought in to identify and fight Count
Dracula. He unmasks him in the drawing room, by inviting Dracula to
look at a small mirror. The vampire, of course, has no reflection, and is
thus revealed for what he is in the very drawing room he has infiltrated.
And so the struggle begins.
Though there is, of course, more to the story of Browning’s
Dracula than can be told here, a moment of truth occurs when Dracula
orders Van Helsing to “come here,” holding out his hand in a gesture of
drawing him closer. A struggle of wills ensues in which Van Helsing
momentarily staggers forward, drawn by the powerful attraction of evil.
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Evil, in the guise of the urbane and sophisticated, has an attraction for us,
and in that attraction lies its power. It appeals to something in us. The
evil which was depicted as wholly other in the figure of Nosferatu has
become one of us in Browning’s Count Dracula, and the Count, it seems,
is able to appeal to our inmost being. Evil is not only among us, it also
reaches inside us, touching something in our very hearts and souls. Van
Helsing, in a show of strength of will acknowledged even by Dracula,
resists the lure of evil, and chases the vampire from the drawing room by
brandishing a cross. Here the contradiction is evident  the scientist,
the man of reason, uses religion, the descendent of magic and
superstition   to expel the vampire.
Tod Browning’s Dracula of 1931 is an important step in the
evolution of the character of the vampire. In Francis Ford Coppola’s film,
Bram Stoker’s Dracula (1992), we have yet another stage   the depiction of
the vampire as a sympathetic figure in a love story. (The film, Bram
Stoker’s Dracula bears scant resemblance to Bram Stoker’s novel,
Dracula.) Gary Oldman portrays the vampire and Winona Ryder, his true
love. Here a backstory explains how a prince came to be a vampire. The
story of the prince who fought for the Church and was wronged is
narrated at the beginning of the film by Anthony Hopkins, who stars as
Van Helsing, the vampire hunter. 
Gary Oldman, as the prince, fought valiantly for the Church against
Muslim invaders. Through treachery and deceit, his princess, played by
Winona Ryder, comes to believe he is dead, and hurls herself to her death
from a castle window into a river far below. Because her death is a
suicide, she is denied burial on sanctified ground by the Church. The
prince declares the Church his enemy, and is destined to become a
vampire    the “undead”    neither dead nor alive. Here he is centuries
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later as the vampire, licking blood from a straight razor used by his guest
from England. 
The vampire travels to England in the guise of an alluring foreigner. 
There he finds and woos the woman who reincarnates his princess.
His is not an attack by night, but a seduction in which the two fall in love,
and she makes the deliberate decision to become a vampire like him and
join him in undeath forever.
20 Teaching Ethics, Spring 2013
Both are hunted down by Van Helsing and her former fiancé. The
film invites questions about who is good and who, evil. We can
understand the prince who is wronged by the Church declaring it his
enemy; we can sympathize with the lost soul of the vampire who wanders
through centuries searching for his true love. When he finds her, we are
not appalled, but, instead, are fascinated by his attempts to woo and win
her. Adopting the perspective of her fiancé and Van Helsing, we question
whether she has been brainwashed, seduced, and deluded through the
powers of the vampire into making a choice she would not make were
she in her right mind. The film portrays the vampire in morally
ambiguous terms. 
In examining these three films, we are able to see an evolution in
how evil is portrayed in the figure of the vampire. In Nosferatu (1922), evil
is purely other, grotesque and animal-like. In Dracula (1931), evil has
become one of us, entering our homes and dwelling among us. In Bram
Stoker’s Dracula (1992), it is unclear whether evil really is evil. The vampire
is the sympathetic hero of a love story. Now, in 2012, we have morally
good vampires, attractive and decent, whom we want to be like. Clearly,
the character of the vampire is still a work in progress.  
ART AND MORALITY
More could be said about vampire films and fiction and what
changing portrayals of vampires might tell us about the cultures and
mindsets from which these works arise. However, I want to close with a
few reflections prompted by Murdoch’s notion that morality is like art. In
her work, this is a very rich idea, meant to counter the view that ethics is
like science. In art, there is something there   a truth, if you will   to be
discovered through creation. Similarly, we both discover and create
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ourselves as moral beings as we attend to others and to ourselves through
introspection. When we look intelligently at art (and here I include the
“art” of popular culture, such as vampire films), we learn to focus and
direct our gaze in ways that heighten sensitivities. We become more aware
of the nuances of good and evil, of human weakness and strength, and
one hopes, our attention becomes informed and guided by compassion.
Murdoch, after all, thought that the moral refinement of attention
resulted in a “loving” gaze, a gaze which scrutinized the world with
kindness. In seeking to cultivate fineness of vision in our students, it
seems to me that we should also seek to inculcate a kindly vision of a
compassionate, charitable bent. 
Charity is compatible with another theme we should stress to our
students, which is that works of art do not spring up fully formed, nor
does goodness come without trial and error. Like art, the morality of
humanity is always a work in progress. We write a draft, we scrap it, we
draft again, we revise, we reread, we keep at it, and eventually, we get a
paper we’re satisfied with. Similarly, we try, we fail, we try again, we get
better, we have a lapse, we pick ourselves up and start again. The
important point is never to give up, never to bash ourselves so badly for
failing that we lose heart, to remember that human life is a journey   that
we are pilgrims, along with others, along a way. 
This message, I believe, is countercultural in three important
respects. First, the emphasis on compassion, especially toward our own
and others’ mistakes, counters the harshly critical cast of much that we
see in the news today, particularly in politics. Second, developing moral
identity takes time. It is not done overnight. One has to work at it. Third,
we need others to develop ourselves. Each of these themes    the stress
on compassion and kindness, the need to continually work on oneself,
and the need for others   runs counter to a rather ruthless current of
individualism evident in our culture today. Part of the message of this
current is that if you don’t succeed now, you’ll never succeed, and if you
need to succeed by cutting corners or doing someone else down, do it.
Murdoch provides a gentler alternative that highlights other values.
Patient looking at others and at one’s self  her ethics of vision  can
empower one to discover the talents and goodness of oneself as well as
others. It can enable students (and others) to believe in themselves   in
their own goodness and worth as persons, in their own talents and
abilities, in their own place in the world. Part of the importance of being
a teacher is that we are called to believe in young people before they are
able to believe in themselves. Through askesis and unselfing, we can invite
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students to discover and create morally good selves, and thereby
overcome the fear and insecurity that often leads to selfish, ruthless
attitudes and behavior. All of this is, of course, highly idealistic. But, then,
what is Murdoch’s ethical vision, if not the idealistic notion that, with
patient attention, we can come to discover the good? 
NOTES
1 This essay was an invited symposium presented at the 14th International
Conference of the Society for Ethics Across the Curriculum on Oct. 4, 2012 at
Grand Valley State University in Grand Rapids, Michigan. I am grateful to
Deborah Mower and Peggy Vandenburg for inviting me to present, and to
Elaine Englehardt and Michael Pritchard for inviting me to submit the essay to
this journal.
2 This section draws on my review of Justin Broackes, ed., Iris Murdoch,
Philosopher: A Collection of Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), in
Ethics (2012), vol. 123, no. 1, pp. 137-141.
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